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Both in continental and Anglo-American law system, object of right is a 
controversial question. This paper’s purpose is to explain the role of object of right in 
the theory about right’s construction.  
Chapter 1 discusses the translations to the article 90 of German Civil Code. I 
hope to reveal the question fully by systematically contrasting the several ways of 
translating about the article 90 of German Civil Code between our scholars and Italian 
scholars.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the origin of the article 90 of German Civil Code and the 
problems it aroused. Before the article 90 of German Civil Code limited “things” to 
“things corporeal”, “things” had included “things corporeal” and “things incorporeal” 
according to the theories of the whole continental law system. In fact, this conception 
directly came from Gaius’ Institution. So in order to study the origin of the article 90 
of German Civil Code, I must go back to the reason that Gaius differed “things 
corporeal” from “things incorporeal” in his Institution.  
Chapter 3 briefly introduces the exsiting doctrines, whose purpose is to conclude 
the level that the study about object of right now attains, which problems exist on 
earth and which are those concrete contentions. Then I come to solve two premise 
problems. First, how does the concept of object in philosophy relate to the concept of 
object of right ? Second, is object of legal relationship different from object of right?  
Chapter 4 is about the essence of right. After the criticism and analysis of 
traditional doctrines, I come to the conclusion that right is not a concept of abstraction, 
but a concept of type, hence it can not be defined but only be described. Only right is 
understood as a concept of type, can we analyse the essentials of right in the integral 
meaning.  
Chapter 5 discusses the role of object of right in the theory of right’s construction. 
According to the description of the concept of right in chapter 4, I think that right is 
composed of inherent essentials and external essentials. Furthermore, inherent 
essentials consist of inherent formal and substantive essentials, the former are legal 
qualifications which are the outside clothes of right and the latter refers to free will of 














right, and right without free will is empty right. To study the inherent essentials of 
right equals to analyse the right itself. External essentials of right consist of the 
subject and object that right relates to. To study the external essentials of right doesn’t 
equal to analyse the right itself, but through this study we can achieve the goal of 
elaborate division of the right. Object of right which particularly manifests the legal 
benefits of subject gives an explanation of right’s foundations, so it is the cross of free 
will and benefits of subject of right. Right is the external exsitence(das Dasein)of 
subject’s free will, and object is the external exsitence of right. According to the 
arrangement of right, object of right can be divided into parts in more than one level. 
Objective things are the first level of object of right which inlude things coporeal and 
incorporeal, object of right in the second level is the right in the first level, object of 
right in the third level is the right in the second level, and on the analogy of this 
successively. Although object (Objekt) of right and subject-matter (Gegenstände) of 
right have the same meaning in west doctrines and theories, it is necessary to 
distinguish one from the other. Object of right states the grounds on which right is 
based, subject-matter of right states the object that the claim of right aims at, the 
former is of significance when we analyse the occurrence of right, and the latter does 
when we analyse the achievement of right. 
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